Introduction
In international trade, liner shipping is one of the oldest operational modes of sea transport, with regular sailings and published tariffs. The liner services provide stable transport requirements between the origin and ports enroute to the destination, which are essential for the smooth functioning of global international trade.
It is obvious and natural that liner operators in specific geographical regions will form a "liner conference" for convenience of operation and fleet management. The predetermined tariff in the trade route under the liner conference gives a strong indication that it is operating in a collusive market situation and possesses powers of oligopoly. The practice of liner conferences has long dominated liner trade routes. In the 1950s, there were over 350 conferences in existence (Wang 2006 , Wong 2009 ). There was general political agreement to adopt published price-fixing within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which lent some measures of longterm stability to the liner shipping industry. The liner shipping conference is a measure that traders seek in order to engage in long-term transport supply relationships at known prices. While most OECD countries provided conferences with antitrust immunity, within the OECD these policies have not been harmonized in spite of considerable efforts to do so (Brooks 2002) . Hard harmonization, which requires governments to legislate identical regimes, seems an unrealistic expectation in an international environment where some countries seek improved consumer welfare (e.g. the US) whilst others seek multilateral integration (e.g. European Union).
The nature of liner operations requires liner companies to provide fixed schedules, publish tariffs and regular sailing (Stopford 1997) . This obliges liner companies to form trade groups to fulfill such requirements in the trade route that they are serving. Such trade groups create speculation among outsiders that they will possess the power of cartel in their aggregated supply volume. However, if the trade groups are forbidden from operating alongside the liner trade, then the supply of tonnage will fluctuate greatly depending on the capabilities of individual operators, as it is fairly easy for a liner company The abolition of the liner conference reset the liner market structure back to 1875 when the first UK-Calcutta conference was formed (Sjostrom 2002) . At that time, the inter-carrier agreement (i.e., the conferences), was formed to end price wars and as a result, excessive shipping capacity built up. Carriers developed a multilateral conference system under which participating carriers operating in specific trades co-operated to reduce price The FEFC (Far East Freight Conference) was abolished in October 2008 so as to give the users (shippers) of liner shipping more flexibility in choosing the liner service. This paper analyzes the data collected before and after the above period to evaluate the extent to which this market has or has not become more competitive.
The capital intensive nature of liner shipping operations has gradually resulted in the industry becoming an example of the market structure of oligopoly (Graham 1985; Harlaftis 2002) . This is particularly characterized by the existence of a few sellers and inter-firm rivalry, although other characteristics are also evident.
The Liner Conferences
There are two types of liner conference existing for various trade routes. They are the open and closed conference.
Open Conference
A conference that merely sets freight rates without restricting membership is termed an open conference (Graham 1987) . In the USA, membership of a liner conference has been open but monitored closely by a government agency. The 1916 Shipping Act allowed an American version of liner conferences by exempting members from antitrust legislation and putting them directly under the supervision of a government agency (Fleming 2002) .
To oversee the industry, the 1916 Act also created an independent agency, known as the Federal Maritime Board. This regime was overhauled with the passage of the US Shipping Act 1984 which introduced the concepts of independent action and service contracts as the means to limit the market power of the conferences, and was reviewed favorably by the Federal Maritime Commission (Brooks 2002 ).
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) in 1998 introduced a new type of agreement, the confidential service contract, into the trade practices. The OSRA 1998 allows shippers negotiate directly with the carriers. After the Act came into effect, the non-competitive oligopolistic market structure of the liner industry was established and freight rates became set on the basis of the competitive market condition (Wang 2006) .
Closed Conference
In contrast to the USA, the liner conference in Europe is described as a closed conference with limits on membership and capacity provision (Graham 1987) . As mentioned by Urrutia (2006) , there are minimum regulations governing the provision of the shipping services in Europe. Member States of the EU are, to a large extent, free to follow their own national shipping policies and create the economic and fiscal framework that they consider most appropriate for the development of shipping activities. In addition to the legality bestowed by individual member states, the geographical nature of the EU allows small (even single ship) liner companies to provide an effective service.
Regulation 4056/86, which was intended to supplement the rules of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, came into force on July 1,1987 and marked the first step in imposing effective regulatory constraints on a sector that had previously been largely self-regulated (Benacchio, Ferrari and Musso 2007) . It is grounded on the acceptance of liner conferences as legitimate, and indeed, the most common form of organization of liner shipping. Since the adoption of Regulation 4056/86, there has been an increase in the number of consortia and alliances as a means of sharing costs and reducing risks in the EU trade routes. The growth of these operational arrangements has been accompanied by a decline in the significance of conferences.
However, the conference system has been progressively and gradually undermined by the strong purchasing power of multinational shippers. Today, an increasing number of shippers fail to see differences between a conference and non-conference arrangement when they select the carrier for their overseas consignments. As a result, the role of the conference has diminished (Brooks 2006) . Shippers expect greater transparency (Bate 1999 ) and an understanding of the operational features of the liner shipping industry and better awareness of their business from the carriers. Shippers expect more co-operation from carriers to overcome difficulties in the supply chain, find longer-term solutions, and co-operation to achieve cost reductions (Nicolette 2007) . (Leach 2006a) . The European Liner Affairs Association (ELAA), which represents most of the major carriers that serve Europe, had already agreed to give up the antitrust exemption in the hope that the EC would adopt its compromise proposal to allow carriers to share information on rates and capacity (Leach 2006a,b) . From a carriers' perspective, sharing information was necessary to justify the large investment made in new ships. The Council's action could possibly trigger the abolition of conference systems worldwide, even in Asia (Leach 2006c) where they have been supported by the governments of China and Japan.
The Economic Context
The term 'market structure' is one that is used by economists ( Berry 2007 , Sutton 2007 to describe how a market is organised, in particular in terms of the number of firms and the barriers to entry for new firms that might wish to enter the market.
The benchmark for empirical investigations is invariably that of perfect competition, a set of market conditions where resources are allocated in the best possible way and where in the long run, firms earn normal profits. In many markets, the requirement of a homogenous product, one of the conditions for perfect competition, does not exist largely on account of branding, advertising and consumer perception. This is much less of an issue in shipping businesses where the provision of liner services for container transport is a relatively standardised product. In practice, though, the conditions that are central to perfect competition do not exist. Deregulation, which involves the removal of barriers to entry, has been widely used by governments to open up markets to competition by making them more contestable. This is not the same as if there were perfect competition.
It can be argued that a liner conference is in many respects the antithesis of a contestable market. Although evidence is hard to come by, the rationale that underpins a liner conference is that it provides a means by which shipping lines can collude on rates, route and hence, safeguard profitability. By restricting competition, it is in the longer term business interests of all of its members to collude or at least agree on the broad basis for business to take place. It is also within the scope of a conference to take protective action if its power is challenged by a non-member or by a member breaking ranks. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm is a model used to link elements of market structure to business conduct and performance in industrial economics (Bain, 1951 ,1956 , Gilbert 1984 , Schmalensee 1989 , Hannan 1991 . The SCP hypothesis states that (1) the exercise of monopoly power should increase as concentration increases and (2) the greater the barriers to entry, the greater the exercise of market power. The paradigm asserts that the certain market attributes affect corporate conduct, which in turn impacts upon profitability, and market concentration which influences the level of competition among companies. The more concentrated the market the lower the level of competition and the higher the profits firms earn. Market structure, conduct and performance are the three elements of the SCP paradigm.
Market structure is how a market is organised in terms of the number of sellers and buyers, product differentiation and barriers to entry into a particular market. For a market to be characterized as being perfectly competitive, certain pre-set conditions must be met as explained above.
Market Conduct is the actual behavior of buyers and sellers in a market. It includes pricing policy (collusive or predatory and discriminatory), activities to raise entry barriers, and "rent seeking" activities to establish regulations to limit competition.
Market performance is the end result of firms operating in any market. The most important characteristics include efficient resource allocation, equity (generally viewed as low consumer prices), employment, technical progress, a generally higher standard of living, and some special social goals.
Hypothesis 1-change of market structure
The first hypothesis to be tested was that the market structure of Far East to Europe trade has changed from oligopoly to a more perfectly competitive state after the abolishment of FEFC.
With a stable freight rate observed before 2008, it is believed that the liner conference possess and behaves like an oligopoly market structure.
The Chow breakpoint test was carried out to test for structural change on the 18-October-2008 by examining whether significant differences can be observed in the samples and if such significant differences are observed, then do they indicate a structural change in the relationship. In addition to Chow's test Figure 1 shows that the freight rate for this route suddenly The Chow Breakpoint Test appears to support the hypothesis that after 18-October-2008, the abolishment of FEFC produced a change in the structure of the Europe-Asia liner shipping market.
Hypothesis 2-closely related market
If the above hypothesis is proven then the market structure will obviously move towards that of perfect competition, as the individual carrier is forced to provide a basic liner service during a period of uncertainty. Without any industrial information, as restricted by ELAA, carriers can only manage to provide a basic (homogenous product) liner service until they feel confident about the trend of the future market. Service contracts signed previously between shippers and carriers (through Liner conference) need to be put aside as the market is taking the spot rate for the freight calculation.
For perfect competition to be present, it is necessary to analyze behavior during the transition period. Therefore, in the following sectiont, the study seeks to show that the liner company's behavior after the European liner shipping market structure changed. The assumption made is that each freight rate index of CCFI has a close relationship. A set of formula is thus constructed:
Where:
represents freight rate index in Europe service route; represents coefficients; represents other 10 freight index issued as parts of CCFI;
represents various adjustment items;
represents the standard error of the equation;
represents market share in each shipping route;
represents the differences between academic study and real practice Equation (1) shows the relationship between the freight rate of each shipping route; the Europe service route is given as an example;
Equation (2) (1), which is used to elaborate the whole assumption. indicates that the and adjusted is over 0.98. This is indicative that the independent variables in the equation explain about 98% of the changes in the dependent variable, which means that the ten independent variables have a particularly strong relationship with the formulation of freight rates for the EUROPE SERVICE. The value, i.e.
probability value, is known as the observed or exact level of significance and defined as the lowest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected (Gujarati 2003) .
The lower the value, the higher the probability. This study indicates that the total 11 freight rate indices are significantly related to each other. Among these indicators, the HONGKONG SERVICE is most significant, with a value 0.0479 (Significant level 5%).
The JAPAN SERVICE is the next with value 0.0444, and E/C AMERICA SERVICE is the third with value 0.0345.
The results of the test not only confirm a significant relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable, but also indicate the changing tendency between the independent and dependent variables. As shown in table 1, the positive and negative coefficient of each independent variable indicates that some of the rise of the variable (with positive coefficient) will lead to a increase in the dependent variable, and some of the rise of the variable (with negative coefficient) will lead to a decrease in dependent variable.
Finally the equation becomes:
When the market structure in liner shipping changes from oligopoly to perfect competition, after the abolishment of FEFC, fierce competition is expected to occur. Theoretically, under perfect competition, the supplier will lower the price in order to capture a larger market share since they all selling a homogenous product. With the demise of FEFC case, the study found that carriers initially lowered their freight charge and the rate remained stable hereafter.
The majority of liner operators, usually global carriers, are operating in nearly all the shipping lines world-wide. If a liner company mainly serving the European region wants to capture business in other regions, it usually will choose a low price strategy to gain market share from its rivals. Adjusting the freight rate downward seems the only means to achieve that objective.
For example, if the company wants to increase the market share in region , then would be lower than before; to keep the equation (2) balanced, the would be higher as the company expects. The company gains high market share in region by offering the lower price . This seems reasonable in a given period, but considering the relationship stated in equation (1) there might be some problems. If is lower than before, clearly it might result in the decrease of (the coefficient of is positive) or the increase of (the coefficient of is negative). But should neither be decreased nor be increased if the company seeks to maintain stability in its market, then it will have to sacrifice profits in other shipping regions, such as region , by increasing or decreasing the (determined by whether is positive or negative) to ensure the is unchanged. If the is positive, then the high price strategy provides an opportunity for its rivals to attack region , which the company seeks to avoid. This kind of situation is true if a company wants to attack a market. It therefore needs to re-allocate its own resources to serve this purpose, since the resources of the company are limited within a period, so there would be some sacrifice if is negative, then the low price strategy in region will impede a company's development as it has to cover various costs to support its expansion. This situation is what the company needs and wants to prevent.
Multimarket contact (MMC)
The above calculation demonstrates that the freight structure in the liner market moved to perfect competition but the freight rate remained stable. The study can explain this outcome by using the Multimarket Contact (MMC) ( Bernheim,& Whinston 1990 , Gimeno 1999 , 2011 which occurs when firms meet the same rivals in multiple markets. When firms compete with each other in more than one market their competitive behavior may differ from that of single-market rivals. Multimarket competition may result in the reduction of competitive intensity among rivals, an effect known as mutual forbearance.
Multimarket contact gives a firm the option to respond to actions or attacks by a rival not only in the market where it is challenged, but also in other markets where they both compete. As a result, multimarket competitors may hesitate to attack in one market for fear of retaliation in other markets where they hold a higher market share. This is quite typical of how oligopolies compete. nearly stable, with only slight fluctuations, which is believed to be good evidence that liner shipping companies are subject to multi-market contact. Figure 3 shows that for W/C AMERICA SERVICE and E/C AMERICA SERVICE, these two major line hauls maintained a stable situation on freight rates during the economic crisis when demand had fallen.
Conclusion:
When the EU governments abolished FEFC in 2008, the liner carriers on Europe-Asia trade routes faced drastic changes in market structure from oligopoly to perfect competition due to constraints imposed by ELAA. Without any information about the current freight market, carriers are forced to provide a basic liner service to all shippers.
Hence the freight charge drops to a lower level.
Unlike the situation in other perfectly competitive markets, in liner shipping the players do not aim to capture larger market share in a particular route by consistently lowering the freight charges. Instead, the liner carrier will lower the freight charges to a certain level and stay there. The stable freight charge is achievable due to the loyalty established through the past business experiences of many shippers and unique liner services that shippers enjoyed before. In addition, multi-market contact helps to affect the liner firms' behavior in lowering the price, as firms lowering freight rates in one market might get revenge in another market. Therefore, the perfectly competitive market gradually turns back to an oligopoly again. In addition, it is also due to the MMC consideration that an individual liner will not engage in cut-throat pricing when the market is in a perfectly competitive state.
However, the new oligopoly stage after the demise of liner conference is slightly different from the former oligopoly format, as the former oligopoly stage in the Europe-Asia shipping route is a direct result of the liner conference. Following the abolishment of FEFC, collusion on freight rates is illegal and the market experiences a perfect competition stage and eventually enters into a newer oligopoly stage. This is a natural evolution in the liner shipping business, liner participants operating in the same shipping route inevitably tend to group together and act in harmony with each other. Therefore the market is deemed to be an oligopoly. The regulation that forces a breaking up of the market structure in the liner Europe-Asia shipping route turns out to be a failure, and evidently any regulations on the liner shipping business would not work since oligopoly is the natural tendency of how the market structure evolves. This is in many respects typical of transport markets in general.
